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Abstract   
Many natural resources lead economies experience worse economic performance than their 
exports lead counterparts. This phenomenon is known as the Resource Curse, and many resource 
abundant countries face it. This study is aimed to critically assess existing Resource Curse theory 
by comparing two seemingly different cases Kazakhstan and Norway. Based on the Resource 
Curse theory hypothesis suggests that there are institutions related preconditions determining the 
presence or absence of the Resource Curse in natural resource abundant countries. To achieve 
the research aim and test the hypothesis the study reviews three major Resource Curse theory 
models: the Dutch Disease, Rent-seeking and Institutions models, and apply them to Kazakhstan 
and Norway. The empirical findings have revealed that oil production has quite similar effects on 
economies of Kazakhstan and Norway, and these findings cannot be fully explained by the 
Resource Curse theory.  
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1. Introduction  
For many years resource abundant countries such as Nigeria, DR Congo, Venezuela and others 
were experiencing low economic growth and living standards. While Asian Tiger economies 
with hardly any natural resources like Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were 
experiencing miraculous economic growth and achieved high living standards. The phenomenon 
of worse economic performance of resource abundant countries comparing to countries with 
fewer natural resources has given rise to a concept of the Resource curse. This concept was 
introduced by Richard Auty in 1993, and has since been used by some prominent scholars (e.g. 
Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner (1997, 2001), Phillip Lane & Aaron Tornell (1999), Halvor 
Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik (2006)).  
Since 1990s when the Resource Curse concept was introduced, multiple models explaining the 
phenomenon developed. However, the problem is that there is no universally accepted theory to 
explain the presence of the Resource Curse in some countries but not others. To address this 
problem, this study will critically assess the Resource Curse theory by comparing two seemingly 
different cases Kazakhstan and Norway. The reasoning behind the choice of two cases is that 
Norway is one of few countries, which avoided the Resource Curse, while Kazakhstan is more 
likely to face the “Curse”. Moreover, Norway is a “classical” case in the Resource Curse 
literature, while Kazakhstan is generally ignored by this type of literature. Thus using these two 
cases will help to impartially analyze theory and theoretical models.  In researching natural 
resources lead economies, the common refrain is whether the country ending up like “Norway or 
Nigeria”. Norway is considered one of the few countries, which managed to turn natural 
resources into the “blessing” rather than “curse”. Hence, Norway proves that it is possible to 
increase the country’s wealth and benefit each member of the society by natural resources 
extraction, while Nigeria is the opposite (Engen et al., 2012, p.259).  On the other hand, 
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Kazakhstan can hardly be classified as the second “Norway” but still the country is managing 
natural resources much better than “Nigeria”.  
Kazakhstan and Norway have significantly different economic and social development 
performances. In development-related indexes Norway is ranked as one of top countries, while 
Kazakhstan is often placed in middle or the bottom of the ranking. For instance, Norwegian GDP 
per capita is one of the highest in the world, and it is more than seven times is higher than 
Kazakhstani (the WB, 2015).  The difference in social development is almost as large as in 
economic one, in Human Development Index Norway is ranked as first, while Kazakhstan is 
ranked as 70th (the UNDP, 2015).    
At the same time, natural resources are the main source of revenues for both countries, and 
specifically hydrocarbons are dominating both economies. While discussing oil sectors in both 
countries, it is necessary to mention Kazakhstan and Norway are at different stages of their life-
cycles as oil-producers. Norway already reached its peak of oil production, while Kazakhstan 
started the oil production only two decades ago and would continue oil production for another 
four decades (BP, 2014).  
 
Figure 1, BP, 2014 
Interestingly, two countries have some similarities in institutional settings related to oil sector. 
Both countries have national companies, representing state interests in oil industry 
KazMunayGas (Kazakhstan) and Statoil (Norway).  Both companies control significant shares of 
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domestic hydrocarbons reserves, and both KMG and Statoil successfully expanded overseas (the 
KMG, 2015, Statoil, 2015).Moreover, Kazakhstan and Norway have well-established Sovereign 
Wealth Funds to stabilize and save oil revenues (the National Fund of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Government Pension Fund of Norway). Both National Funds are limiting the 
flow of oil revenues into the budget, and still they are well-integrated into national budgets.  
 
Aim of the Research   
The aim of this thesis is to critically asses the hypothesis that there are preconditions related to 
institutions, determining the presence or absence of the Resource Curse in natural resource 
abundant countries as stated by the Resource Curse theory. There are several different theoretical 
models and I will look at three major ones (the Dutch Disease, Rent-seeking and institutions 
model) using the comparison of two case studies Kazakhstan and Norway.  
Research Question:   
To achieve the research aims, and test the hypothesis, the following research question with sub 
questions were formulated.  
Can the Resource Curse theory explain cases of Kazakhstan and Norway, whatever they avoided 
the Curse or not.   
a) What is the role of oil in economies of Kazakhstan and Norway?  
b) What is the level of rent-seeking in Kazakhstan and Norway?   
c) What is the quality of oil related institutional frameworks in two countries? 
Limitations 
This study is not capable to cover all existing Resource Curse models, and thus the study is 
limited to three general models: the Dutch Disease, Rent-seeking and Institutional models. These 
three models is a general and simplified summary of existing Resource Curse theory.     
Other limitations are related to the data quality and its comparability. The study includes data on 
rent-seeking, which is often based on estimates, and thus it might be not very accurate.   
Moreover, since the study employs a comparative approach, involving two different countries, 
sometimes the data is coming from different sources, and then it is important to examine how 
comparable the data is.  
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2. Methods     
The choice of the research strategy, design and method was determined by the research question. 
To achieve the research aims and answer the research question, the comparative design will be 
used. The comparative design involves studying two contrasting cases employing identical 
research methods. The comparative design can provide better understanding by analyzing the 
phenomenon in relation to two different cases. The major argument in favor of comparative 
study is that it improves theory building. It is easier to establish the circumstances in which a 
theory will or not hold by comparing two seemingly contrasting cases. Additionally, new 
concepts or theories may emerge from the comparison itself (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003 in 
Bryman, 2008, p.60; Bryman, 2008, p.58-60).  The comparative design will assist to achieve the 
primary aim of this study to assess the Resource Curse theory.   
Since the aim of this study is a critical assessment of existing theories, this paper does focus 
mainly on theories supported by empirical data from two cases. Choosing relevant cases was one 
of the challenges of this comparative study. Norway is chosen as a classical case, which avoided 
the Resource Curse, while Kazakhstan is quite uncommon case, it is unknown whatever the 
country avoided the Curse or not. This choice of cases will help to impartially identify theory 
shortcomings.  To make a comparison quantitative indicators will be used, since it is easier to 
operate and compare them. However, sometimes quantitative indicators cannot give the full 
understanding of the case, thus some specific qualitative data will be incorporated. All data for 
this study was collected either by official agencies (the WB, IMF and national statistical 
committee) or other researchers (Cohen, Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva, and Engen et al.). This data 
and its analysis have numerous advantages such as high quality, saved time and resources, and 
opportunity to analyze the data over different time periods.  
3. Background 
If we briefly review the development of oil industries in Kazakhstan and Norway, the more 
distinct structural differences can be seen.  
Until the oil and gas were discovered and extracted in early 1970s, Norway was economically 
lacking behind its neighbors Sweden and Denmark. The started oil production along with the 
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exploration of new fields turned Norway into the large oil and gas producer, and allowed the 
country to catch-up with Scandinavian counterparts (Engen et al., 2012, p. 260).   
Comparing to many other resource-abundant countries, at the time of oil exploration, Norwegian 
economy was well organized, the main sources of revenues were exports of wood, pulp, paper, 
fish, timber, iron and shipping services. Moreover, already at this time Norway was a country 
with a well-established democracy, efficient bureaucracy and well-educated population. Thus 
multinational oil companies, which were known for taking the rule wherever they operated, 
faced strong trade unions, environmental movements, community organizations and active civil 
society. All these lead the oil industry to a trajectory different from many other resource-
abundant countries (Engen et al., 2012, p. 260).   
With the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan became an independent state in 1991. Hydrocarbon 
deposits were discovered during the Soviet time but these large deposits were practically 
explored only in the mid-1990s after the independence (Cohen, 2008, p.11).  For instance, large 
oil deposits of Tengiz field were confirmed by Soviet geologists in 1970-1980s but the proper oil 
extraction did not take place until early 1990s (Cohen, 2008, p. 116). This delay can be explained 
by the fact that Caspian fields require offshore drilling, which is technically challenging. After 
the failure of the USSR to develop required technologies on its own, North Caspian fields 
became a subject of discussions and agreements between the USSR and Chevron in 1988.   
With the liquidation of the Soviet institutions, Kazakhstan became responsible for the 
development of an emerging oil and gas industry. Newly independent Kazakhstan cancelled all 
previous agreements between Kremlin and Chevron, and started to build up new institutional 
framework. The government set up new institutions such as the National Oil Company 
Kazakhstanmunaigaz, the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources, the Ministry of Geology and 
Protection of Mineral Resources. The new structure of oil industry was quite chaotic, and the 
jurisdiction of these bodies often overlapped, which lead to the political struggle and 
competition. Consequently, in Kazakhstan multinational oil companies faced institutional 
structure very different from Norwegian one.  .  
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4. Theoretical Framework  
The Resource curse concept was introduced by Richard Auty in his book “Sustaining Growth in 
Mineral economies” (1993). The Resource Curse refers to the phenomenon of worse economic 
performance in resource-abundant countries comparing to resource-poor countries (Auty, 1993, 
p.1).  It can be seen that the definition of the Resource Curse is quite loose, and this causes 
loopholes in the whole theory of the Resource Curse. There is no neither universally accepted 
Resource Curse theory nor explanation of this phenomenon. After the extensive literature review, 
three main Resource Curse models were identified: the Dutch Disease, Rent-seeking and 
Institutions models.  The majority of the relevant research is based on these three models or their 
modified versions. The models will be analyzed in chronological order, to see the development 
of the Resource Curse theory.     
The Dutch Disease model 
Firstly, the Dutch Disease model will be reviewed. In 1995 Sachs & Warner statistically 
confirmed the negative correlation between the resource abundance and economic growth, and 
basing on these results they developed a theoretical model of the Resource Curse. Now the Dutch 
Disease model is considered the original model of the Resource Curse theory. The Dutch Disease 
is an economic term, referring to a coexistence of booming sector and lagging sub-sectors of 
traded goods in the economy. Booming sector pressures the lagging one by pulling the resources 
from the later one, and causing the rise of relative price of non-traded goods. (Corden & Neary, 
1982, p.825). This crowding-out logic is a basis of Sachs & Warner’s model.  
Natural resources production naturally crowds-out growth-generating sectors of the economy. 
There is a debate about what exactly drives economic growth, the Dutch Disease model (Sachs & 
Warner, 1995, 1999 in Sachs & Warner, 2001) defines growth-generating sector as 
manufacturing. In the Dutch disease model the economy has three sectors: a tradable natural 
resources sector, a tradable manufacturing sector and a non-traded sector. Only manufacturing 
and non-traded sectors use capital and labor. In resource abundant economies, tradable 
production is allocated within the natural resources sector, and capital and labor are used in non-
traded sector. As a result, with natural resources boom, the manufacturing sector tends to 
squeeze, while non-traded sector expands.  Increased revenues lead to excess demand for non-
traded goods and increased non-traded prices. Non-traded goods are used as inputs in 
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manufacturing, thus higher prices for inputs in combination with fixed international prices lead 
to lower profits in manufacturing sector. Consequently, the decline in manufacturing undermines 
economic growth. Moreover, Sachs & Warner found out the correlation between resource 
abundance and higher price level of non-tradable sectors, and came to conclusion that resource 
abundant countries have higher price levels. Manufacturing sector using expensive domestic 
inputs, and selling outputs in international markets, is losing its competitiveness. As the result, 
manufacturing sectors fail to develop, while non-tradable sectors continue to expand (Sachs & 
Warner, 1997, p.6, 23). Finally, natural resources abundant countries often fail to pursue export-
led growth because of high-price level and lack of exports promotion.   
The problem with the Dutch Disease model is that it suggests unconditional negative correlation 
between natural resources abundancy and economic performance. Thus the Dutch Disease model 
fails to explain cases such as Norway, Botswana, Australia and others, which managed to escape 
from the Resource Curse. This suggests that there are some important pre-conditions, which are 
not included into the Dutch Disease model. These important pre-conditions might include either 
the quality of institutions, the structure of economy or something else.    
The Rent-seeking model 
Comparing to the Dutch Disease model, rent-seeking model emphasizes the role of power groups 
and institutional frameworks. Lane & Tornell (1999) claim that economies experience lower 
economic growth because of distortionary redistributive activities (rent-seeking) rather than from 
shrinking manufacturing sector as the Dutch Disease model assumes. In rent-seeking model the 
natural resources sector is the one which is squeezed because of harmful rent-seeking activities, 
and there is no positive wealth shocks. Consequently the explanation part is also quite different 
from the Dutch Disease model, Lane & Tornell (1999, p. 41) explain the phenomenon of the 
Resource Curse by the distributive struggle in resource abundant countries, as power groups try 
to appropriate the rents generated by natural resources. The key to prevent or minimize negative 
effects of rent-seeking are institutions or coordinated actions of power groups. Power groups can 
be defined as local governments receiving transfers from the center, strong unions seeking 
patronage and conglomerates obtaining kickbacks.    
Comparing to the Dutch Disease model, the economy sectors are divided very vaguely. In rent-
seeking model the economy has two sectors: a formal efficient sector (in this case natural 
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resources sector) and informal less efficient one. The taxes levied from the formal sector are the 
source of fiscal transfers to powerful groups.  To protect their profits from taxation, powerful 
groups allocate their profit in the shadow sector, which has lower rate of return. The official 
sector has high returns, and countries with powerful groups respond to increased revenues 
by high fiscal spending and slower economic growth.  
Lane & Tornell (1999, p.34) explain increased fiscal spending and worse economic performance 
by “Voracity effect”. The Voracity effect can be defined as a more-than-proportional rise in 
discretionary redistribution (government spending) in response to the increased returns of official 
sector. The Voracity effect generates a negative relationship between increased revenues and 
economic growth. The mechanism of the national government as a recipient of natural resources 
revenues and budget processes are “convenient” for power groups to appropriate revenues by the 
means of government transfers. Thus, the revenues are often wasted without any gain in welfare 
or growth. The low economic performance indicates that public capital expenditures are not used 
efficiently, and appropriated revenues were consumed, invested in informal sector or 
abroad (Lane & Tornell, 1999, p.40).    
The explanation of the Resource Curse by rent-seeking makes sense. However, the problem is 
that the rent-seeking model depends on the context (institutions). Institutions are determining 
will the economy and oil sector, particularly, be affected by rent-seeking activities. Thus, the 
quality of institutions is the determining factor for the Resource Curse rather than rent-seeking.  
 
The institutions model 
The following institutions model combines both institutions and rent-seeking in the analysis. 
Mehlum et al. (2006) developed institutions model, which focuses on the role of rent-seeking and 
institutions in resource abundant countries. Comparing to Lane & Tornell’s (1999) rent-seeking 
model, Mehlum et al. consider that some forms of rent-seeking might be less harmful than 
others.  Moreover, institutions model analytically connects institutions with rent-seeking making 
the model more developed.  Still in institutions model, institutions are the decisive factor of how 
natural resources abundance affects economic growth (Mehlum et al., 2006, p.3). Mehlum et al. 
write that natural resources abundance puts institutions to some kind of test, and thus Resource 
Curse appears only in countries with inferior institutional arrangements. The examples 
supporting institutions model are natural resources lead economic growth winners Botswana and 
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Norway, which have good institutions and low level of corruption. While countries with inferior 
institutions such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico and Congo have worse economic performance 
comparing to Botswana and Norway.  The mix of weak institutions and natural resource 
abundance causes the Resource Curse.  
The main finding of the study by Mehlum et al (2006, 2006, p.7) is that natural resources 
abundance does hinder economic growth only in countries with grabber friendly institutions, 
while countries with producer friendly institutions are not affected by Resource Curse. Thus, 
institutions model rejects the Dutch Disease model’s unconditional negative correlation between 
the resource abundance and economic growth.  To fully understand the role of institutions 
Mehlum et al. (2006, p.6) incorporate rent-seeking and focus on the tension between special 
forms of rent-seeking and production. All forms of rent-seeking can harm the economy but some 
forms can be more or less harmful than others. In the economy with producer friendly 
institutions rent-seeking and production are complementing activities, since institutional settings 
such as rule of law, law level of corruption, efficient bureaucracy and low risks of the 
government repudiating contracts imply  that efficient rent-seeking is open for producers only. In 
competition for natural resources rents, producers still have legal and institutional limits in 
lobbying for lucrative contracts, subsidies and public support. On the other hand, grabber 
friendly institutions provoke direct wealth grabbing: corruption, political rent appropriation, 
shady dealings, expropriation, extortions and others.  In this situation, it is disadvantageous to be 
a producer, and thus production and rent-seeking are competing activities.    
Natural resources lead economies constitute both growth winners and losers. According to 
institutions model, difference in institutions quality is the main reason of diverging economic 
performance among resource abundant countries. However, many resource-abundant countries 
have centralized power and weak institutions, and still there is a big variation of how natural 
resources wealth is managed even among the countries with grabber friendly institutions. 
Consequently, the lack of good institutions only does not explain the variance in economic 
performance and growth in resource-abundant countries (Kendall-Taylor, 2011, p.345).   
In sum, the theoretical framework of the Resource Curse is quite inconsistent. The vague 
definition and absence of universally accepted explanation only weaken the whole theoretical 
framework of the Resource Curse. The analytical review of three major theoretical models 
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identified even more shortcomings of the theory as a whole, and shortcomings of each model 
specifically.  
The Dutch Disease model suggests that there is unconditional negative correlation between 
natural resources abundance and economic growth. As a result the Dutch Disease model fails to 
explain cases such as Norway, Botswana, Australia and others, which escaped from the Resource 
Curse.  
The rent-seeking model assumes that institutions may decrease or even prevent rent-seeking, 
harming the economy, but the model fails to incorporate institutions into the analysis. Thus it is 
unclear whatever the rent-seeking or the quality of institutions determine the economic 
performance of resource abundant countries. On the other hand, institutions model ignores the 
big variance in economic performance among countries with bad institutions. Comparing to the 
Dutch Disease model both the rent-seeking and institutions models do reject the idea of 
unconditional negative correlation between natural resources abundance and economic growth.  
5. Previous Studies    
The literature comparing Kazakhstan and Norway’s oil sectors and resource dependency is 
scarce. One of few examples of academic comparison between Kazakhstan and Norway is 
Mathias Lucke’ (2010) article “Stabilization and Savings Funds to Manage Natural Resource 
Revenues: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan vs. Norway”. The study gives an overview of petroleum 
reserves, resource rents costs, macroeconomic importance of oil sector, and oil production data 
between three countries. After that National funds’ role is explained, and the detailed overview 
of each fund is given, Lucke (2010) sets up Norwegian oil fund as a benchmark. Norwegian oil 
revenues are managed very efficiently and transparently, while Kazakhstan oil fund lacks both 
transparency and efficiency partly because of strengthened presidential control over the oil 
sector.   
As it was mentioned earlier, there is very little written about Kazakhstan. Still, following two 
studies give a good overview of Kazakhstan’s oil sector.  
Wojciech Ostrowski (2010) analyzes how Kazakhstan’s political regime sustains itself by the 
means of oil sector in his book “Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan”. To do so Ostrowski reviews the 
government, local and foreign companies involved into oil production both directly and 
indirectly during the time period from 1991 until the mid-2000s. To collect the data about these 
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companies Ostrowski (2010) conducted interviews with companies’ workers and oil-sector 
related officials. Finally, Ostrwoski comes to conclusion that comparing to Norway, where the 
government facilitates the cooperation between local and foreign companies, Kazakhstan’s oil 
industry develops apart from the local economy because of political interests. Thus Kazakhstan 
risks to follow the path of petro-states rather than Norway’s path.    
Yessengali Oskenbayev, Mesut Yilmaz and Kanat Abdulla (2013) investigate effects of energy 
and agricultural resources abundance on economic growth through institutional quality in their 
article “Resource concentration, institutional quality and the natural resource curse”. Using data 
from 14 regions in Kazakhstan, they claim that the type of natural resources does not have 
significant role in economic performance but rather an excess production, which breeds the rent-
seeking, which in its turn negatively affects economic growth. The resource abundance does not 
influence the economic growth directly i.e. the resource curse theory might not hold. The effects 
of natural resources on economic performance depend on the quality of institutions.    
On the other hand, Norway is a classical case in the Resource Curse literature, and thus it was a 
challenge to identify the most relevant ones.  
Steinar Holden’s article “Avoiding the Resource Curse the case of Norway” (2013) discusses the 
effects of petroleum sector on Norwegian Economy and reviewing main features of petroleum 
management. To analyze the presence of the Dutch Disease and Resource Curse Holden (2013) 
starts with examining the development of Norwegian oil sector and related government policies. 
The author checks economic indicators such as GDP per capita and manufacturing sector’s 
wages. Holden (2013) concludes that Norway does not experience neither the Dutch Disease nor 
the Resource Curse due to high quality of institutions.   
Ole Engen, Oluf Langhelle and Reidar Bratvold (2012) analyze why Norway avoided the Dutch 
Disease and the Resource Curse, and discuss the present challenges of Norwegian oil industry in 
a chapter “Is Norway Really Norway?” Engen et al. (2012) explain Norway’s success by 
developed democratic framework within which the oil industry took off. Norway managed to 
develop the petroleum-industrial complex. This complex shows how economic and political 
interests create power groups, capable of influencing government policies.  However, the 
petroleum-industrial complex did not lead to weakening institutions, since it was developed 
within the “Nordic model” (the development framework of postwar Nordic countries). The 
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Nordic model consists from institutions organizing negotiations, distributing wealth and 
resolving conflicts. The Nordic model stabilized oil-related political and social issues, and 
allowed Norwegian oil sector to avoid controversies for many years. However, recently there is a 
rising conflict between the petroleum-industrial complex and environmentalists.  
To conclude, it is not clear does the literature in general confirm the Resource Curse theory or 
not. From the literature reviewed on Kazakhstan, it is still uncertain does the country experience 
the Resource Curse or not. The authors came to the general conclusions that Kazakhstan has 
quite weak institutional framework, and thus the country risks to face the Resource Curse in the 
future.  On the other hand, the literature on Norway share the idea that the country successfully 
avoided the Resource Curse because of high quality of institutions. To conclude this chapter, it 
seems that Kazakhstani and Norwegian oil industries are following different development 
trajectories. Let’s turn to two cases, and look at importance of oil sector, its impacts economies 
and roles of institutions and rent-seeking.    
6. Empirical Findings   
To answer the research question and test the hypothesis, the importance of oil and its impact on 
the economy, and institutions quality and rent-seeking will be discussed in this chapter.  
Importance of oil for Kazakhstan and Norway   
Firstly, the dependence of Kazakhstan and Norway from oil should be identified. To do so, 
contribution of natural resources to GDP and the size of natural resources rents indicators will be 
employed.   
Figure 2 shows the contribution of natural resources to GDP in Kazakhstan and Norway. These 
contributions are calculated as a percentage of GDP from natural resources rents. It can be seen 
that in overall, the share of natural resource rents, especially oil, is very high in Kazakhstan. At 
the same time Kazakhstan has a large variety of natural resources, while the main source of 
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natural resources rents for Norway are oil, gas, and forest (0.1%).   
 
Figure 2, the WB, 2015 
 
The following graph (Figure 3) gives information on the size of natural resources rents relating 
to GDP over time period from 1970 to 2012. In Kazakhstan natural resources’ rents as 
percentage of GDP have always been higher than in Norway, since Kazakhstan’s independence 
in 1991. However, one should keep in mind the significant difference in GDP between two 
countries, Norwegian GDP is more than two times bigger that Kazakhstan’s one. Thus both 
monetary contribution and monetary size of rents will be significantly higher for Norway.  The 
increasing natural rents as well as increasing contribution of natural resources to GDP shows the 
rising dependency of Kazakhstan and Norway from oil.   
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Impact of oil production on economies  
All three models agree that countries experiencing the Resource Curse have worse economic 
performance. According to the Resource Curse theory, resource abundant countries should have 
lower economic growth than resource-poor countries. Therefore, the following graph (figure 4) 
shows economic growth for eleven countries for the time period between 1961 and 2013. The 
graph includes data on Kazakhstan and Norway, and their resource abundant and resource poor 
counterparts.  The choice of countries was determined by both economic and historical factors.  
The data for former Soviet Union countries is available only from late 1980s, while for 
Scandinavian countries the data is available for the whole period. In average it can be seen that 
there is no dramatic difference neither between Norway and its Scandinavian counterparts, nor 
between Kazakhstan and its former Soviet Union counterparts.  Consequently, at least for this 
cases resource abundancy does no cause the difference in economic performance, which 
contradicts the Resource Curse theory.   
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Figure 4, the WB, 2015 
 To continue with the analysis, the GDP structure will be examined. Figure 5 shows the GDP 
structure in Kazakhstan and Norway in 2000 and 2012. It can be seen that in both countries the 
share of industries increased over time, while manufacturing decreased. According to the 
Resource Curse theory, the decreasing share of manufacturing can be one of the signs of the 
“Resource Curse”. Moreover, the manufacturing share decreased quite significantly in both 
countries, which might mean that the manufacturing sector is actually crowded out by natural 
resources sector. At this point it is very interesting that the share of manufacturing is higher in 
Kazakhstan than Norway. The following figure (Figure 6) represents the structure of 
merchandise exports of Kazakhstan and Norway. Surprisingly, the structure of exports is quite 
similar in both cases. The share of fuels exports is quite high in both countries, while other 
sectors goods have less significant shares. The decreasing share of manufacturing and fuels 
dominance in exports may suggest the idea that both countries might be experiencing a potential 
Resource Curse.    
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Figure 5, the WB, 2015 
  
 
Figure 6, the WB, 2015 
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The declining share of manufacturing and non-oil exports suggests weakening competitiveness 
of non-oil sectors, and the erosion of competitiveness of the economy as a whole. There is no 
comprehensive measure of economic competitiveness but the Unit Labor Costs can reflect the 
cost of competitiveness. Unit labor costs (ULC) can be defined as “the average cost of labor per 
unit of output and calculated as the ratio of total labor costs to real output” (OECD, 2015). The 
ULC is a link between the cost of labor and productivity in generating output. In the case if the 
rise of the ULC is higher than the rise of productivity, the overall competitiveness of the 
economy will decrease. In the case of oil-producing countries, higher labor costs negatively 
affect non-oil sectors of the economy: high wages of oil sector are pushing up wages in other 
sectors, thus undermining the competitiveness of non-oil sectors (the IMF, 2013).  On the 
following graphs, it can be seen that the ULC in Norway are significantly higher than in other 
European countries.  At the same time productivity rise is slower than the rise of labor costs. 
Consequently, the non-oil sectors of Norway are becoming less competitive.   
 
Figure 7, the IMF, 2013 
  
The following graph shows that in Kazakhstan the rise of Unit Labor Cost is actually lower than 
the rise of labor productivity. According to IMF report (2014), Kazakhstan is actually gaining 
competitiveness, which  suggests that country still might pursue exports-lead growth.  
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Figure 8, the IMF, 2014 
According to the Resource Curse theory, the resource abundant countries tend to have high price 
level in general. As it was discussed earlier high labor costs without increased productivity lead 
to lower competitiveness, and it seems to be a case for many resource abundant countries. Often 
natural resources-related sectors have higher wages than other sectors, and this might rise wages 
in the whole economy. Theory does not assume that only higher wages crowd out manufacturing 
but still higher wages of oil-sector might lead to lower innovations and entrepreneurship in non-
oil sectors. Entrepreneurs and innovators are encouraged to shift to oil sectors due to higher 
returns, and thus the manufacturing experiences lower productivity and innovations (Sachs & 
Warner, 2001).  The following graphs are giving information on average monthly earning by 
economic activities in Kazakhstan and Norway. In Kazakhstan employees of mining sector have 
significantly higher wages than their counterparts in other sectors. However, high wages of the 
mining sector has not lead to increased wages in other sectors.  
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Figure 9, Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Committee on Statistics, 2014 
 The figure 10 shows the changes in monthly earnings by sector for Norway, and it can be seen 
that wages in non-oil sectors are also increasing, especially in retail and wholesale trade. This 
can lead to the conclusion that the oil sector is pushing up wages in other sectors as well.  
 
Figure 10, the IMF, 2014 
Finally, after reviewing the importance of oil sector and its impact on the economy, it might be 
concluded that oil sectors are dominant in both Kazakhstan and Norway. The petroleum sector 
has large shares in countries’ outputs and exports, and the sector’s revenues contribute 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014
Average Monthly Earning by Economic 
Activities, KZT
The mining industry and working out of open-cast mines
Manufacturing industry
Wholesale and retail trade; car and motorcycles repairs
23 
 
significant share of countries’ GDP. It can be seen that the oil sector negatively affected 
Norwegian economy’s competiveness by rising wages in non-oil sectors, while Kazakhstan’s 
economy is not affected by the oil sector in the same way. Kazakhstan actually managed to gain 
competitiveness by keeping low wages and increasing productivity. However, the economic 
growth rates of both Kazakhstan and Norway are not very different from each other, and they are 
not very different from their counterparts neither. In the end, the results are contradicting each 
other, and it is still not clear are the countries experiencing the Resource Curse or not. To find 
out the clear explanation, and clarify these contradictions, one should try to refer to theoretical 
models. The following section will apply institutions and rent-seeking models to the cases of 
Kazakhstan and Norway, potentially these models can explain the empirical findings presented 
earlier. The Dutch Disease model would not be included, since the model is lacking explanation 
of the Resource Curse phenomenon (see theoretical part).  
Institutions and rent-seeking 
To analyze the institutions quality, two indexes will be used: the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) Project and Revenue Governance Index (RGI). The WGI is one of the most 
commonly used institutional quality indexes. The WGI is produced by the World Bank affiliated 
institutions, and the research is financed by one of the World Bank research programs. The WGI 
is a dataset combining the views of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents on the 
quality of governance. The survey data is produced by think-tanks, survey institutes, non-
governmental organizations, private sector firms, and international organizations. The WGI 
Project includes six indicators of governance: Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. The 
indicators are presented in a form of percentile ranking. In this percentile ranking 0 corresponds 
to the lowest rank, while 100 corresponds to the highest (the WGI, 2015). 
Figure 11 shows the WGI indicators for Kazakhstan and Norway in 2013. Overall Norway is 
placed among the countries with the highest scores range of 90-100, while Kazakhstan is ranked 
in the second lowest percentile range of 10-25 (WGI, 2013). The difference between two 
countries is especially large in Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption indicators. 
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The second index RGI is produced by an independent non-governmental organization Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, which promotes effective, transparent and accountable 
management of natural resources. The RGI measures the quality of governance in the oil, gas 
and mining sectors in 58 countries. The RGI is based on expert survey, which is quite similar to 
the WGI index. The RGI includes four main indicators: Legal Setting, Safeguards and Quality 
Controls, Reporting Practices, and Enabling Practices. Additionally, the index provides 
information on special mechanisms to manage natural resources - state-owned companies, 
subnational revenue transfers and natural resource funds. For total scoring (where the Reporting 
Practices account for 40%, and other indicators account for 20% each) Norway is ranked as 
number one, while Kazakhstan is ranked nineteenth. As in the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Project, in this index Kazakhstan has the lowest score in the indicators related to the government 
accountability (the NRGI, 2015).   
Rank Country Resource 
measured 
Composite Institutional 
and legal 
setting 
Reporting 
practices 
Safeguards 
and quality 
controls 
Enabling 
Environme
nt 
1 Norway Hydrocarbons 98 100 97 98 98 
19 Kazakhstan Hydrocarbons 57 62 58 76 32 
Table 1, the NRGI, 2013 
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Control of Corruption
Government Effectiveness
Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Voice and Accountability
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013
Norway
Kazakhstan
Figure 11, the WB, 2015 
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After reviewing the quantitative data on institutional quality, it might be concluded that the 
quality of institutions in two countries is very different. However, one should be aware of the 
statistical data limitations. It is quite hard to quantify the quality of institutions, thus some 
additional evidence is required. From the previous studies, it was found that Kazakhstan’s oil 
sector was involved into multiple controversies, the most well-known were the Kazakhgate 
Corruption Scandal and Zhanaozen riots. The Kazakhgate Corruption Scandal was centered on 
the bribe payments of $78 million paid on behalf of multinational oil companies ExxonMobil, 
ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips and British Petroleum to Kazakhstan’s top officials in 1990s to 
secure lucrative oil contracts. The case originated as a corruption investigation aiming at the 
former prime minister, and it was initiated by Kazakhstan officials. However, the investigation 
changed the trajectory once the FBI and Swiss authorities got involved. The joint investigation 
uncovered a scheme of bank accounts linked to Kazakhstan’s senior officials. The government 
kept a distance from both the trial against the American citizen, who facilitated oil contracts and 
from the uncovered bank accounts.  Later, the government had to admit the existence of bank 
accounts and transfer money for the charity (Cohen, 2008, p.59).  
Zhanaozen riots refer to the labor conflicts in three oil companies (national KazMunaiGaz, and 
two joint ventures with CNPC and ENI) happened in Zhanaozen town (Western Kazakhstan) in 
2011.Western Kazakhstan is well-known for high price level, high unemployment rate and 
underdeveloped business sector. The region is dependent from the oil producing sector, which 
does not provide many employment opportunities for local people.  Moreover, workers have bad 
living and working conditions, many local households lack basic services. Zhanaozen, where the 
main protests took place, experienced significant population increase during the oil boom, thus 
the population consisted from foreign workers and domestic labor migrants. The disproportional 
remuneration between the local and foreign workers caused tensions. The conflict between local 
workers and companies started in May, and escalated in December. The companies refused to 
recognize unofficial labor unions, while the workers ignored the official pro-government labor 
union. Companies and local authorities kept a hard line, and responded to protests by dismissing 
workers. On Independence Day (December 16th) the police tried to clear the square from the tent 
city set up by dismissed workers, this provoked the protesters. As a result of the clash between 
protesters and the police, at least 16 people were killed and more than 100 injured. Witnesses 
reported that the police was shooting unarmed protestors but the government shielded the 
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security forces by claiming that they had to defend themselves. The unrest continued for another 
couple days, with the government imposing the state of emergency and curfew, and limiting 
internet and phone communication in Zhanaozen. The lack of strong independent 
institutionalized labor unions pushed people towards informal unions and protest actions. 
Zhanozen riots did not lead to any serious institutional reforms except some political reshuffling 
(Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva, 2015).  At first this conflict can be viewed as a regular labor conflict 
but actually it might be viewed as conflict over rents between capital and labor. The oil-
companies, shielded by the government, claimed that wages were already high enough, ignoring 
the fact of the region’s high price level. The companies determined to increase the profits, kept 
the wages low. On the other hand the government did not ensure fair distribution of oil revenues 
between the regions, and oil-producing regions’ population was excluded from rising economic 
prosperity, concentrated in Astana and Almaty (current and former capitals).     
On the other hand, Norwegian oil sector has not been involved in any controversy except some 
political clashes between the oil sector and environmentalists. For many decades there was a 
general agreement between political parties regarding the development of oil sector.  However, 
recently there is a debate regarding the domestic use of natural gas, exploration of new fields in 
Lofoten areas and the Barents Sea, and the climate change. Currently this debate is won by oil 
industry, since the industry has a significant power in Norwegian politics. Thus the industry has 
a power to resist any fundamental changes in the economy and fossil fuels consumption. In the 
future Norway might develop in the direction of a petro-state, which prioritizes oil production 
and fossils consumption over the environmental issues. However, despite of the fact that the oil 
industry has a vast political power, oil related politics are still institutionalized and the part of 
democratic political system of Norway (Engen et al., 2012).    
The qualitative information seems to confirm the institutional quality indexes: Norway has much 
better institutional settings than Kazakhstan. If the institutions model applied to these two cases, 
then Norwegian institutions can be considered producer friendly, since they prevent direct wealth 
grabbing and facilitate oil production. On the contrary, Kazakhstan institutions can be regarded 
as grabber friendly, since the institutions provoke corruption and hinder the production. Then 
following institutions model’s logic, Norway with its good institutions should not experience the 
Resource Curse, while Kazakhstan with its inferior institutions should experience it.    
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If one apply the rent-seeking model, Kazakhstan does not have neither institutions, capable to 
prevent rent-seeking, nor power groups coordinating their activities. Thus country should have 
unreasonably high fiscal spending, to satisfy power groups with their share of appropriated 
revenues. However, from the graph below (figure 12) it can be seen that Kazakhstan actually 
follows quite prudent fiscal policy with low government expenditures level. Moreover, it can be 
seen that Kazakhstan’s spending level is quite stable over the last decade, comparing to other 
natural resources lead economies. On the contrary, Norway spends quite a lot but high 
government expenditures can be explained by the generous welfare state.  
 
Figure 12, the IMF, 2015 
  
To sum up this chapter, Kazakhstan and Norway have very different quality of oil-related 
institutions. As both quantitative and qualitative data prove Kazakhstan is vulnerable to rent-
seeking activities, while Norwegian institutions prevent harmful rent-seeking.  Despite this 
difference, the economic effects of oil production are quite similar for both countries. Rent-
seeking and institutions model fail to explain similar economic effects of oil sector on economies 
of Kazakhstan and Norway. Finally, the empirical part shows that the Resource Curse theory 
cannot give clear explanation to similar economic effect of petroleum sector on economies of 
Kazakhstan and Norway. Moreover, presented theoretical models implied that the effects should 
be different due to institutional quality but it does not stand anymore.  
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7. Conclusion  
The study tested the hypothesis “there are institutions related preconditions determining the 
presence or absence of the Resource Curse in natural resource abundant countries.”, and came to 
the conclusion that the hypothesis does not stand, since Kazakhstan and Norway have very 
different quality of institutions but still the economic impacts of oil sector on economies are 
quite similar. Thus the institutional preconditions identified by the theory do not affect the way 
how the oil production was expected to affect the economy. 
The study answered the formulated research question “Can the Resource Curse theory explain 
cases of Kazakhstan and Norway, whatever they avoided the Curse or not”.   
a) What is the role of oil in economies of Kazakhstan and Norway?   
The quantitative data shows that the oil sectors are dominating over other sectors in both 
Kazakhstan and Norway. The hydrocarbons revenues constitute significant shares of the 
countries’ GDP.  As a result of rising oil sector, the manufacturing sector is being crowded out. 
Interestingly, the rising oil sector negatively affected only Norwegian economic competitiveness, 
while Kazakhstan actually increased its competitiveness.  
b) What is the level of rent-seeking in Kazakhstan and Norway?    
The qualitative data shows that in the past Kazakhstan had multiple cases of harmful rent-
seeking in the oil sector. At the same time the quantitative data, represented by the government 
spending, shows that the rent-seeking is supposedly decreasing, since the government spending 
has been quite low and stable for the last decade. On the other hand, the qualitative data did not 
reveal any harmful rent-seeking in Norway, except some political tensions between the oil sector 
and environmentalists. The quantitative data on government spending shows that Norway has 
very high level of government expenditures caused by the generous welfare system.  
c) What is the quality of oil related institutional frameworks in two countries?  
The employed by the study two indexes identified that Kazakhstan and Norway have a big 
difference in the quality of institutions. Moreover, the qualitative data on rent-seeking confirmed 
that Kazakhstan have worse institutions comparing to Norway. Consequently, Norwegian 
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institutions can be considered good and producer-friendly, while Kazakhstan one are bad and 
grabber-friendly. 
After answering the sub questions, one can go back to the main research question.  As it was 
mentioned before, the empirical data reveals that the hydrocarbons have quite similar effects on 
economies of Kazakhstan and Norway even if there is a big difference in the institutions quality. 
None of the reviewed theoretical models was capable to provide coherent explanation to the 
similar economic performance of these two seemingly different cases. Finally, the Resource 
Curse theory cannot fully explain the similarities between two seemingly different cases 
Kazakhstan and Norway, and this might suggest that the theory needs to be more developed.  
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